Michigan Law Review
Volume 55

Issue 1

1956

Negligence - Duty of Care - Duration of Status of "Driver" for
Puropses of Guest Statute
George Kircos
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Torts Commons, and the Transportation Law Commons

Recommended Citation
George Kircos, Negligence - Duty of Care - Duration of Status of "Driver" for Puropses of Guest Statute, 55
MICH. L. REV. 141 (1956).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/14

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1956]

RECENT DECISIONS

141

NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF CARE-DURATION OF STATUS OF "DRIVER" FOR
PURPOSES OF GUEST STATUTE-Plaintiffs were guests riding in defendant's
automobile. Defendant stepped out of the vehicle leaving the motor running, the hand brake unset, and the automatic shift in neutral position.
A departing passenger brushed against the gear lever and started the vehicle
which struck a wall causing injuries to the plaintiffs. On appeal from
judgment adverse to the plaintiffs, held, reversed. Defendant may be held
liable for ordinary negligence. California's "guest" statute! limiting guests

l

Cal. Vehicle Code (Deering, 1948) §403.
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to recovery for injuries sustained by the driver's willful misconduct does
not apply in this case, since the defendant ceased to be a driver the moment
he stepped out of the vehicle. Panopulos v. Maderis, (Cal. App. 1956) 293
P. (2d) 121.
Absent a controlling statute, the driver of a vehicle has a duty to
exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid injuries to his guests.2 The
perils of modem highway driving, and claims that frequent collusion of
driver and guest in actions against the driver's insurer had caused insurance
rates to rise,3 led to the adoption of statutes in twenty-six states limiting
the driver's liability.4 These statutes, generally considered constitutional,:!
limit recovery by a guest to certain types of conduct, such as willful misconduct or gross negligence on the part of specified individuals.6 Whether
the defendant is a "driver" within the scope of a guest statute is dealt with
for the first time in the principal case. Prior cases considered extensively
the scope to be given the term "guest,"7 but had not passed on the definition of "driver" or "operator" under these statutes. The statutes commonly
make the operator or owner liable to guests for gross negligence. Only
the California statute is limited in scope to the driver of the vehicle.a
Superficially, it could be argued that the California legislature must have
intended to afford limited liability only to those in actual physical control
of the vehicle, as the principal case holds. Otherwise it certainly could
have adopted the language of any one of twenty-five other statutes. This
2Avery v. Thompson, 117 Me. 120, 103 A. 4 (1918); Dashiell v. Moore, 177 Md. 657,
11 A. (2d) 640 (1940); Saxby v. Cadigen, 266 Wis. 391, 63 N.W. (2d) 820 (1954). This rule
compares a guest in a vehicle with a licensee upon realty. A minority view, which allows
recovery only when the driver has been grossly negligent, analogizes guest to bailor and
operator to bailee. Passler v. Mowbray, 318 Mass. 231, 61 N.E. (2d) 120 (1945); Slaton v.
Hall, 172 Ga. 675, 158 S.E. 747 (1931); 65 A.L.R. 952 (1930).
3 Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581 (i931). These claims as reasons for
guest statutes are challenged in White, "The Liability of an Automobile Driver to a NonPaying Passenger," 20 VA. L. R.Ev. 326 (1934).
4 Ala. Code (1940) tit. 36, §95; Ark. Stat. (1947) §75-913; Cal. Vehicle Code (Deering,
1948) §403; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) §13-9-1; Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 21, §6101; Fla.
Stat. (1955) §320.59; Idaho Code (1948) §49-1001; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 95½, §58 (a); Ind.
Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1952) §47-1021; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1949) §8-122b; Mich.
Comp. Laws (1948) §256.29; Mont. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1954) §32-1113; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1952)
§39-740; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929; Supp. 1938) §4439; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953)
§64-24-1; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §39-15; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §4515.02; Ore.
Rev. Stat. (1953) §30.110; S.C. Code (1952) §46-801; S.D. Code (1939) §44.0362; Tex. Civ.
Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1948) art. 6701b; Utah Code Ann. (1953) §41-9-1; Vt. Stat. (1947)
§10.223; Va. Code (1950) §8-646.1; Wash. Rev. Code §46.08.080; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann.
(1945) §60-1201.
o Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 50 S.Ct. 57 (1929); Naudzius v. Lahr, note 3 supra. But
see Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589, 271 P. 998 (1928), which held that a statute denying
any recovery was unconstitutional as a denial of due process of law.
6 See 96 A.L.R. 1479 (1935).
7 See 82 A.L.R. 1365 (1933).
s There are other "guest" statutes that mention "driver." The Illinois statute includes
"driver," but also includes owner, operator, employer, and agent. Montana includes the
driver's intoxication but also includes the gross negligence of an owner or operator within
its scope. North Dakota and Utah use "driver" along with "owner" and "person respon•
sible for the operation of the car" in limiting liability to gross negligence.
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argument, however, rests on questionable grounds. The policy reasons
behind guest statutes in general should apply here, for there is as great a
possibility of collusion between insured and guest as in any other highway
negligence situation. According to the strict definition which this court
adopts, "operator" as well as "driver" would include only those in actual
physical control of a vehicle.9 But a long line of cases indicates that
"operator" as used in other statutes may include an owner who is not the
person in actual physical control.10 In another context the California
court has concluded that "the driver of the vehicle," as used in a statute
requiring a driver to render assistance to a victim of an accident, included
an owner present in the automobile, but without physical control of the
vehicle.11 Thus the rule of the principal case, that driver includes only
those in actual control, would seem to be inconsistent with past decisions,
and would logically call for further limitations on the concept of "driver."
The rule might be extended to exclude from the operation of the statute
drivers who had fallen asleep, or who had been thrown from a vehicle
before an accident.12 One possible way to avoid this undesirable result
would be to say that as long as the "ride" continues, all parties, including
the driver, remain in the same relationship to each other.13 Since a ride
may be considered to continue as long as there is a "guest" in the vehicle,
the duration of the ride might in tum be contingent upon_ duration of the
guest status. As long as the plaintiff remains in the guest status, the guest
statute would apply, and who is ultimately responsible would be a secondary question.
George Kircos

9 Cf. Cal. Vehicle Code (Deering, 1948) §§69, 70. Both driver and operator are defined
as a person "who drives or is in actual physical control of a ... vehicle."
10 See 13 A.L.R. (2d) 378 (1950). Especially interesting in this connection is Sutton
v. Tanger, 115 Cal. App. 267, 1 P. (2d) 521 (1931).
11 People v. Odom, 19 Cal. App. (2d) 641, 66 P. (2d) 206 (1937).
12 Cf. 138 A.L.R. 1388 (1942).
13 In Puckett v. Pailthorpe, 207 Iowa 613, 223 N.W. 254 (1929), the court said at p.
618 that the plaintiff was not a guest within the statute "because no driver was operating
the machine." However, the court stated that if the injury had taken place after the trip
had started, but the group had stopped for snacks during which time the accident occurred,
the results might have been different. In Frankenstein v. House, 41 Cal. App. (2d) 813,
107 P. (2d) 624 (1940), a driver left an unattended car upon a hill. The car rolled down
the hill and injured a passenger who had been riding in the car. The court did not discuss
the status of the driver at all but said at page 816: "As long as a person, without compensation to the driver, has entered a car upon the invitation of such driver and remains
'in the vehicle upon the highway', 'during such ride' (sec. 403) he is a guest and cannot
recover damages for the simple negligence of the host."

